Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

Novo Nuñez, Paula and Garrido Colmenero, Alberto (2013). Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.. In: "20th Annual Conference. European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.", 25/06/2013 - 29/06/2013, Toulouse, Francia.

Description

Title: Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.
Author/s:
  • Novo Nuñez, Paula
  • Garrido Colmenero, Alberto
Item Type: Presentation at Congress or Conference (Article)
Event Title: 20th Annual Conference. European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
Event Dates: 25/06/2013 - 29/06/2013
Event Location: Toulouse, Francia
Title of Book: European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. 20th Annual Conference.
Date: 2013
Subjects:
Faculty: E.T.S.I. Agrónomos (UPM) [antigua denominación]
Department: Economía y Ciencias Sociales Agrarias [hasta 2014]
Creative Commons Licenses: Recognition - No derivative works - Non commercial

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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual perspective of existing revealed preference studies is relaxed. This is achieved in two treatments; first, we determine the information subjects receive about the demand revealed by other subjects in a similar decision making situation, second, collective action is implemented whereby all subjects are required to purchase the group?s median quantity at a given price. Participants in the experiment were offered the opportunity to contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Allowances purchased were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In our experiment, information about other subjects? behaviour has no treatment effect on the demand for climate protection. Under collective action however, the probability of purchasing allowances is higher compared to the reference treatment situation, an individual contribution mechanism. Furthermore, we observe a strong correlation between subjects? demand and their expectations about other participants? behaviour. When collective action is not available, subjects? e xpectations are consistent with free rider behaviour.

More information

Item ID: 25922
DC Identifier: http://oa.upm.es/25922/
OAI Identifier: oai:oa.upm.es:25922
Official URL: http://www.webmeets.com/EAERE/2013/
Deposited by: Memoria Investigacion
Deposited on: 03 Jul 2014 14:57
Last Modified: 22 Sep 2014 11:38
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