Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

Novo Nuñez, Paula y Garrido Colmenero, Alberto (2013). Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.. En: "20th Annual Conference. European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.", 25/06/2013 - 29/06/2013, Toulouse, Francia.

Descripción

Título: Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.
Autor/es:
  • Novo Nuñez, Paula
  • Garrido Colmenero, Alberto
Tipo de Documento: Ponencia en Congreso o Jornada (Artículo)
Título del Evento: 20th Annual Conference. European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
Fechas del Evento: 25/06/2013 - 29/06/2013
Lugar del Evento: Toulouse, Francia
Título del Libro: European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. 20th Annual Conference.
Fecha: 2013
Materias:
Escuela: E.T.S.I. Agrónomos (UPM) [antigua denominación]
Departamento: Economía y Ciencias Sociales Agrarias [hasta 2014]
Licencias Creative Commons: Reconocimiento - Sin obra derivada - No comercial

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Resumen

In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual perspective of existing revealed preference studies is relaxed. This is achieved in two treatments; first, we determine the information subjects receive about the demand revealed by other subjects in a similar decision making situation, second, collective action is implemented whereby all subjects are required to purchase the group?s median quantity at a given price. Participants in the experiment were offered the opportunity to contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Allowances purchased were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In our experiment, information about other subjects? behaviour has no treatment effect on the demand for climate protection. Under collective action however, the probability of purchasing allowances is higher compared to the reference treatment situation, an individual contribution mechanism. Furthermore, we observe a strong correlation between subjects? demand and their expectations about other participants? behaviour. When collective action is not available, subjects? e xpectations are consistent with free rider behaviour.

Más información

ID de Registro: 25922
Identificador DC: http://oa.upm.es/25922/
Identificador OAI: oai:oa.upm.es:25922
URL Oficial: http://www.webmeets.com/EAERE/2013/
Depositado por: Memoria Investigacion
Depositado el: 03 Jul 2014 14:57
Ultima Modificación: 22 Sep 2014 11:38
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