Valuation of a new entrant in an oligopolistic market, including its option to abandon: A real-life case

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to increase current empirical evidence on the relevance of real options for explaining firm investment decisions in oligopolistic markets. We study an actual investment case in the Spanish mobile telephony industry, the entrant in the market of a new operator, Yoigo. We analyze the option to abandon in order to show the relevance of the possibility of selling the company in an oligopolistic market where competitors are not allowed free entrance. The NPV (net present value) of the new entrant is calculated as a starting point. Then, based on the general approach proposed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001), a binomial tree is used to model managerial flexibility in discrete time periods, and value the option to abandon. The strike price of the option is calculated based on incremental EBITDA margins due to selling customers or merging with a competitor.