Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

Garrido Colmenero, Alberto y Novo Nuñez, Paula (2013). Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.. En: "2013 EAAE PhD Workshop.", 29/05/2013 - 31/05/2013, Leuven.

Descripción

Título: Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.
Autor/es:
  • Garrido Colmenero, Alberto
  • Novo Nuñez, Paula
Tipo de Documento: Ponencia en Congreso o Jornada (Artículo)
Título del Evento: 2013 EAAE PhD Workshop.
Fechas del Evento: 29/05/2013 - 31/05/2013
Lugar del Evento: Leuven
Título del Libro: EAAE. 2013 PhD Workshop.
Fecha: 2013
Materias:
Escuela: E.T.S.I. Agrónomos (UPM) [antigua denominación]
Departamento: Economía y Ciencias Sociales Agrarias [hasta 2014]
Licencias Creative Commons: Reconocimiento - Sin obra derivada - No comercial

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Resumen

The objective of this study is to analyze the common pool resource appropriation and public good provisiondecisions in a dynamic setting, testing the differences in behavior and performance between lab and field subjects. We performeda total of 45 games in Nicaragua, including 88 villagers in rural communities and 92 undergraduate students. In order to analyze sequential decision making, we introduce a dynamic and asymmetric irrigation game that combines the typical social dilemmas associated to irrigation systems management.In addition, in 9 out of 22 villagers’ groups, we implemented a treatment that included the disclosure of subjects’ appropriation of the common pool resource. The results reveal that the provision of individuals’ appropriation level results in higher appropriation in subsequent rounds. In addition, the results show that non-treated villagers provide more public good than treated villagers but if compared with students the differences are not significant. The results also suggest that appropriation levels are below the Nash prediction of full appropriation, but above the social efficient level. This results in an efficiency loss in the game that can be explained to a large extent by individual decisions on appropriation and public good contribution and by group appropriation behavior.

Más información

ID de Registro: 25981
Identificador DC: http://oa.upm.es/25981/
Identificador OAI: oai:oa.upm.es:25981
URL Oficial: http://www.bvle-aber.be/eaae/
Depositado por: Memoria Investigacion
Depositado el: 10 Jul 2014 16:35
Ultima Modificación: 25 May 2015 14:24
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