Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments

Jiang, Shan and Liao, Jianxin and Gong, Jun and Wang, Jingyu and Li, Tonghong (2015). Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments. In: "40th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks", 26-29 Oct 2015, Clearwater Beach, Florida, Estados Unidos. ISBN 978 1 4673 6769 1. pp. 365-372. https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN.2015.7366331.

Description

Title: Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments
Author/s:
  • Jiang, Shan
  • Liao, Jianxin
  • Gong, Jun
  • Wang, Jingyu
  • Li, Tonghong
Item Type: Presentation at Congress or Conference (Article)
Event Title: 40th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
Event Dates: 26-29 Oct 2015
Event Location: Clearwater Beach, Florida, Estados Unidos
Title of Book: Proceedings of the 40th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
Date: 2015
ISBN: 978 1 4673 6769 1
Volume: 1
Subjects:
Freetext Keywords: Overlay; Traffic engineering; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg game; Coalition; Shapley value
Faculty: E.T.S. de Ingenieros Informáticos (UPM)
Department: Lenguajes y Sistemas Informáticos e Ingeniería del Software
Creative Commons Licenses: Recognition - No derivative works - Non commercial

Full text

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer, such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (498kB) | Preview

Abstract

Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt game theoretic approaches to analyze this hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1- player non-cooperative game, where overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leadern-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, where TE is the leader and coexisting overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, where players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions.

Funding Projects

TypeCodeAcronymLeaderTitle
Government of SpainTIN2013-46883UnspecifiedUniversidad Politécnica de MadridBIGDATAPAAS: Una plataforma como servicio para big data
Madrid Regional GovernmentS2013/ICE-2894CLOUD4BIGDATAUniversidad Politécnica de MadridCLOUD4BIGDATA: Efficient Cloud and BigData: Infrastructure

More information

Item ID: 41992
DC Identifier: http://oa.upm.es/41992/
OAI Identifier: oai:oa.upm.es:41992
DOI: 10.1109/LCN.2015.7366331
Official URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/search/searchresult.jsp?newsearch=true&queryText=Competitive%20equilibrium%20and%20stable%20coalition%20in%20overlay%20environments
Deposited by: Memoria Investigacion
Deposited on: 11 Jan 2017 13:55
Last Modified: 11 Jan 2017 13:55
  • Logo InvestigaM (UPM)
  • Logo GEOUP4
  • Logo Open Access
  • Open Access
  • Logo Sherpa/Romeo
    Check whether the anglo-saxon journal in which you have published an article allows you to also publish it under open access.
  • Logo Dulcinea
    Check whether the spanish journal in which you have published an article allows you to also publish it under open access.
  • Logo de Recolecta
  • Logo del Observatorio I+D+i UPM
  • Logo de OpenCourseWare UPM