Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments

Jiang, Shan; Liao, Jianxin; Gong, Jun; Wang, Jingyu y Li, Tonghong (2015). Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments. En: "40th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks", 26-29 Oct 2015, Clearwater Beach, Florida, Estados Unidos. ISBN 978 1 4673 6769 1. pp. 365-372. https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN.2015.7366331.

Descripción

Título: Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments
Autor/es:
  • Jiang, Shan
  • Liao, Jianxin
  • Gong, Jun
  • Wang, Jingyu
  • Li, Tonghong
Tipo de Documento: Ponencia en Congreso o Jornada (Artículo)
Título del Evento: 40th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
Fechas del Evento: 26-29 Oct 2015
Lugar del Evento: Clearwater Beach, Florida, Estados Unidos
Título del Libro: Proceedings of the 40th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
Fecha: 2015
ISBN: 978 1 4673 6769 1
Volumen: 1
Materias:
Palabras Clave Informales: Overlay; Traffic engineering; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg game; Coalition; Shapley value
Escuela: E.T.S. de Ingenieros Informáticos (UPM)
Departamento: Lenguajes y Sistemas Informáticos e Ingeniería del Software
Licencias Creative Commons: Reconocimiento - Sin obra derivada - No comercial

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Resumen

Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt game theoretic approaches to analyze this hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1- player non-cooperative game, where overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leadern-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, where TE is the leader and coexisting overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, where players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions.

Proyectos asociados

TipoCódigoAcrónimoResponsableTítulo
Gobierno de EspañaTIN2013-46883Sin especificarUniversidad Politécnica de MadridBIGDATAPAAS: Una plataforma como servicio para big data
Comunidad de MadridS2013/ICE-2894CLOUD4BIGDATAUniversidad Politécnica de MadridCLOUD4BIGDATA: Efficient Cloud and BigData: Infrastructure

Más información

ID de Registro: 41992
Identificador DC: http://oa.upm.es/41992/
Identificador OAI: oai:oa.upm.es:41992
Identificador DOI [BETA]: 10.1109/LCN.2015.7366331
URL Oficial: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/search/searchresult.jsp?newsearch=true&queryText=Competitive%20equilibrium%20and%20stable%20coalition%20in%20overlay%20environments
Depositado por: Memoria Investigacion
Depositado el: 11 Ene 2017 13:55
Ultima Modificación: 11 Ene 2017 13:55
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