Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model

Abellanas Oar, Manuel ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5043-6417, López González, M. Dolores ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9974-7918, Rodrigo Hitos, Javier and Lillo Villalobos, Isabel (2011). Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model. "International Journal of Game Theory" ; ISSN 0020-7276. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0241-y.

Descripción

Título: Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model
Autor/es:
Tipo de Documento: Artículo
Título de Revista/Publicación: International Journal of Game Theory
Fecha: 2011
ISSN: 0020-7276
Materias:
ODS:
Palabras Clave Informales: Nash equilibrium - Computational geometry - Game theory - Location
Escuela: E.T.S.I. Caminos, Canales y Puertos (UPM)
Departamento: Matemática e Informática Aplicadas a la Ingeniería Civil [hasta 2014]
Licencias Creative Commons: Reconocimiento - Sin obra derivada - No comercial

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Resumen

Spatial models of two-player competition in spaces with more than one dimension almost never have pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and the study of the equilibrium positions, if they exist, yields a disappointing result: the two players must choose the same position to achieve equilibrium. In this work, a discrete game is proposed in which the existence of Nash equilibria is studied using a geometric argument. This includes a definition of equilibrium which is weaker than the classical one to avoid the uniqueness of the equilibrium position. As a result, a “region of equilibrium” appears, which can be located by geometric methods. In this area, the players can move around in an “almost-equilibrium” situation and do not necessarily have to adopt the same position.

Más información

ID de Registro: 6739
Identificador DC: https://oa.upm.es/6739/
Identificador OAI: oai:oa.upm.es:6739
URL Portal Científico: https://portalcientifico.upm.es/es/ipublic/item/578886
Identificador DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0241-y
URL Oficial: http://www.springerlink.com/content/v126228207171p...
Depositado por: Memoria Investigacion
Depositado el: 29 Abr 2011 09:14
Ultima Modificación: 12 Nov 2025 00:00