The Unbearable Heaviness of Being in Phenomenologist AI

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to pin down the misuse of Heidegger’s philosophal insights within the discipline of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. In this paper we argue that a central thesis of phenomenology, in Husserl’s words, “putting the world between brackets”, has led to a positioning in embodied AI that deeply neglects fundamental representational aspects that are totally necessary for the purpose of building a theory of cognition. The unification of representational and being-in-the-world aspects, are necesary for the explanation and realization of complex consciousness phenomenon in a cognizer, both animal and mechanic. The emphasis on the self (post-cognitivists), on the being (phenomenologists), as well as the Being by Heidegger’s followers, has contributed interesting insights concerning the puzzle of cognition and consciousness. However, has neglected the necessity and even denied the possibility to provide a scientific theory of cognition. On the other hand, the phenomenologist’s separation of the world into two different ones, the scientific and objective world, and that of our common and lived experience is untenable. The claim that any scientific-theoretical world must find its foundation in the so called live world is ill-founded. In this paper we will propose the basis of a theoretical framework where only one world —with entities and processes— exists and can be known to a certain degree by the cognitive system. This calls for a unified vision of both ontology and epistemology.